The Ethics of Belief
A Historical and Philosophical Overview
The debate surrounding the ethics of belief has a rich history in philosophy, with its roots tracing back well before the 19th century. However, the term „ethics of belief“ gained prominence through an 1877 essay by William Kingdon Clifford, a Cambridge mathematician and philosopher. Clifford’s essay, along with William James’ response „The Will to Believe“ in 1896, set the stage for much of the subsequent discussion on this topic.
Clifford’s position, often characterized as strict evidentialism, is encapsulated in his famous principle:
„It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.“
He illustrates this with a story about a shipowner who convinces himself of his vessel’s seaworthiness despite doubts, resulting in the loss of lives at sea. Clifford argues that the shipowner is culpable not just for the deaths, but for the belief itself, even if the ship had safely reached its destination.
In contrast, James proposed a more lenient view, suggesting that in certain contexts, it is permissible or even obligatory to form beliefs without sufficient evidence. However, James set strict conditions for when such „genuine options“ arise, including that the hypothesis must be „live,“ forced, and momentous.
The History
The debate between evidentialism and non-evidentialism has deep historical roots. Descartes, in his Meditations, argued that in forming judgments, „it is clear by the natural light that the perception of the intellect should always precede the determination of the will.“ Locke, too, moralized against believing without reason, viewing it as a form of intellectual laziness or moral failing.
Continental Rationalists like Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz emphasized the importance of clear and distinct ideas in forming rational beliefs. They argued for the supremacy of reason and rational insight in belief formation. On the other hand, Empiricists like Locke and Hume stressed the role of sensory experience. Hume went so far as to claim that many of our beliefs, particularly those about causal relationships, cannot be rationally justified but are based on habit and psychological association.
The Present
In contemporary philosophy, the debate between evidentialism and non-evidentialism continues to play a central role. Evidentialists maintain that it is always wrong to believe anything on insufficient evidence, emphasizing the importance of rational scrutiny and evidential support in belief formation. Non-evidentialists, following James’ lead, argue that there are contexts where it is acceptable or even necessary to form beliefs without sufficient evidence, particularly in matters of faith and morality.
This ongoing debate has far-reaching implications for philosophy of mind, epistemology, and moral philosophy. It raises fundamental questions about the nature of belief, the conditions under which beliefs are justified, and the relationship between belief and action. As we continue to grapple with these issues, the historical perspectives provided by thinkers like Clifford, James, and their predecessors offer valuable insights into the complex interplay between evidence, belief, and ethical responsibility.
The Future
The ethics of belief remains a central topic in philosophy, challenging us to consider not just what we believe, but how and why we come to hold our beliefs. As we navigate an increasingly complex world of information and misinformation, the question of what constitutes ethical belief formation becomes ever more pressing, making this centuries-old debate as relevant today as it was in Clifford’s time.
